The Houthis fail to win trust, whilst others are losing control
Sometimes things are a bit strange. Expressions are used in conversations without even knowing their origin. This realisation happened to this author when seeking an especially clever and quick solution to a problem said: “That was trick 17”. When researching the origins of this expression, the problem started with the fact that there is no general consensus in Europe about which trick is implied. The Finns say “trick 3”, while the Swiss refer to “trick 77”.
It seems, then, that there are many stories about where the saying comes from. According to some, it refers to that one, very special, ultimate trick that was missing from a great magician’s book of spells. Or 17 is also a very high score in the English card game whist. Or it could be a plan from the First World War numbered 17, which, however, failed. That is why the phrase ‘Trick 17’ was used in the past when something didn’t work out. In the end, it seems that the origin of the saying is really not known exactly. It’s actually quite astounding!
If Artificial Intelligence (AI) was asked to name the origin, it would most probably give more creative answers. However, it is always advisable to check the relevant sources for their reliability and accuracy, as AI’s hallucinations are, after all, almost legendary. At the 24th German-Malaysian Round Table (GMRT), recently held at the Düsseldorf Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the focus was not only on Malaysia, but also on AI as a key topic.
In his lecture, “Same AI, Different Needs: Why One Solution Doesn’t Fit All – On Cultural Differences and Individual Needs”, the engineering psychologist Dr. Magnus Liebherr, head of the work group “Human Factors and Cognition” at the University of Duisburg-Essen, spoke in detail about the psychological and cultural aspects of AI use. From a subjective perspective, this appears to be a field that has received relatively little attention so far in the academic world. Nevertheless, it is a highly valid area of study, as some highlights from the presentation show.
In Germany, of all the countries surveyed, there is the least willingness to entrust certain key social roles to AI. The question was asked if children should be educated by AI or medical examinations and diagnosis should be made by AI, or whether AI could be a daily friend or companion. It was clear in the answers that it was not about how advanced the technology is, but about the psychology. And this can also be applied to normal daily business when it comes to introducing AI-supported systems in various countries.
Unfortunately, however, according to the figures presented it seems that there is (still) a history of failures. 80% of AI projects in companies are failing and do not deliver any business advantage. This is, after all, double that of the still astonishingly high failure rate of standard IT projects. According to the speaker, quite a few companies (namely 42% in 2025) are, therefore, expected to have stopped a substantial proportion of their AI initiatives. And the ultimate reason for this is not the technology, but the people.
A deciding factor is the huge amount of distrust in the use of AI, which also takes in the possible various roles for AI. So, in the end, it comes down to winning the trust of people, which is achieved through roles such as a guide or advisor as people want to maintain the control over AI. In roles such as those of doctors and teachers, it is about AI winning trust by showing appropriate capabilities. Exactly here it seems that control is a key issue.
However, if the current media coverage is followed in this context, even the major AI corporations and their representatives appear to be somewhat concerned that control over AI could very quickly be lost, and are therefore calling for a slowdown in the speed of development. Otherwise, as Dr Liebherr’s presentation also highlighted, not only could control be lost, but also the trust of consumers and businesses. Yet, according to the business models, these stakeholders are expected to pay a substantial price for the benefits of AI in the long term. Otherwise, the investments will not pay back. And, of course, any publicised loss of control offers the media the potential for a headline that could damage a company’s reputation.
Whoever thought that the situation in the Middle East could not get any worse has been proven wrong. Now the Houthi rebels have also entered the conflict and are threatening even more important transport routes in Yemen for oil and refined products from Saudi Arabia. A central pipeline has already been heavily damaged. This, consequentially, has had a big impact on the oil price and has caused another huge price increase for petrol and diesel. This, in turn, deprives consumers and businesses of the purchasing power that is urgently needed for a broader economic recovery.
This also reduces the prospect of a swift resolution to the crisis, which has been forced by the military action from Israel and the US. Consequently, with the exception of the US-dollar, the capital markets have a renewed focus of a ‘risk-off’ approach. Industrial metals have fallen across the board in recent days, and nickel is trading at around USD 16,300.00, in the absence of further verbal or practical support from Indonesia, having previously reached prices of USD 16,000.00/mt, as was also the case at the beginning of July 2026.
Shortly before editorial deadline, there was news from Indonesia. On the 4th January 2027, a new commodity market with the name of ICOMEX should commence trade, starting also with tin and ferronickel from the outset. In a parliamentary hearing, the responsible government representative Sarjito let it be known that he expects that Indonesia, via the market (and other measures) will move from being a price influencer to a price maker.
When the pressure eases
After the last issue which had dealt with climate change and low water levels, as well as the government’s neglect of implementing resilience measures, here is another example from this category. Unfortunately, we do have to rub salt into the wound quite often. But apparently, there is no progress without pain.
The ifo-Institute recently published an interesting study on critical raw materials entitled “Mapping the EU Landscape of Critical Raw Materials” (Link https://www.ifo.de/en/project/2026-03-01/mapping-eu-landscape-critical-raw-materials) Critical raw materials are once again very much in the spotlight, also due to geopolitical and tariff policy disputes. However, this discussion had already taken place many years ago (around 2010), after prices for so-called rare earths and other raw materials had exploded against a background of sharply rising global demand (above all because of China’s growth). At the time, because of this, Oryx Stainless initiated, supported and funded a study with the Technical University of Berlin on the topic: “Key raw materials nickel, chrome and iron: Limited availability despite sufficient geological reserves?”. The corresponding research findings from 2012 can be found on the website as follows: Future availability of chrome and stainless steel scrap more critical than crude oil – Oryx
In connection with this study by the ifo-Institute it is interesting that chrome, as a very critical raw material, does not really appear here, nor in other relevant publications, even though deposits of chrome ores are concentrated in so few countries. This is even though chrome has an important industrial significance.
Furthermore, an appropriate guidelines committee had already been set up by the renowned Association of German Engineers (VDI), which had drawn up a corresponding VDI guideline by 2018 on the assessment of raw material criticality – VDI 4800 Part 2 – which also contained numerous recommendations and specific indicators for companies to assess their dependencies and evaluate measures to increase resilience. However, it seems that everything was just a waste of paper. Unfortunately, politicians and, above all, the companies themselves quickly lost interest again at the time, as the fundamentally volatile raw material prices began to fall once more. The pressure was gone and everything carried on as before – against better judgement.
This is unfortunate, for the temporary respite to make the necessary adjustments is lost and there is much more pressure today than ever was, as the ifo-study shows. Basically, perhaps an example such as this should be used to investigate and make transparent the reasons why such a ‘hot’ topic was abandoned again, rather than taking action. Perhaps these mistakes can now be avoided, even if availability were to increase again and prices and dependencies were to temporarily decrease once more.
Battery raw materials: Demand grows again, but no longer everywhere
After the very severe corrections of past years, the markets for battery metals have also shown renewed signs of a recovery. The prices for lithium, nickel and cobalt have significantly increased from their lows of 2024 and 2025. But, unlike other early periods of growth, this development is not really characterised by a boom in demand, but more by restrictions in supply.
In particular, state interventions play a central role. The Democratic Republic of Congo, the most important global cobalt producer, has been restricting its exports since 2025. Indonesia, crucially having the most influence on nickel markets worldwide, is trying to control production with mining quotas. Also, production cutbacks, including the temporary suspension of the large Jianxiawo lithium project in China, have contributed to a stabilisation of the lithium market.
The trend in demand does, however, remain the deciding factor for medium term price direction A look at the development of lithium-ion batteries shows that the long term growth trend remains intact. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the global usage of lithium-ion batteries in 2025 was around six times higher than that of 2020. Around 70 percent of this demand was attributable to electric vehicles.
However, the growth of the electric car market has significantly weakened. This could possibly change with the continuing high diesel and petrol prices. Whilst sales figures world wide for electric vehicles increased by 20 percent in 2025, the growth in the first five months of 2026 was only 0.9 percent. North America, in particular, saw a decrease of 25 percent and China was 15 percent down on the same period last year. In contrast, Europe saw an increase of 26 percent, while the rest of the world even increased growth by 89 percent. The main driver for this development was the increase of Chinese exports in other Asian markets.
At the same time, stationary battery storage systems are emerging as a second major driver of demand for lithium. Global installed storage capacity has increased more than twentyfold within five years. Already 15 per cent of global demand for batteries in 2025 was attributable to grid and energy storage systems. The expansion of renewable energies, in particular, is increasing the need for storage systems to stabilise the electricity grids.
However, not every group of battery raw materials is profiting equally from this trend. The dominant battery technology for stationary storage systems, and increasingly in the automotive sector as well, is lithium iron phosphate (LFP). This technology does not need nickel or cobalt and, according to the IEA, has now reached a market share of around 50 per cent. Whilst lithium is therefore benefiting from several growth drivers, the outlook for nickel and cobalt is under greater pressure.
This indicates a new reality for the raw material markets. Demand for battery materials may be still growing, but clearly more differentiated than was expected just a few years ago. In addition, rising raw material prices increase the cost for batteries and could, therefore, themselves become an obstacle to further growth in demand. A new commodity boom like the one at the start of this decade does not, therefore, really seem very probable – even if the importance of battery metals for energy transition remains unchanged.
LME (London Metal Exchange)
| LME Official Close (3 month) | ||||
| September 17, 2026 | ||||
| Nickel (Ni) | Copper (Cu) | Aluminium (Al) | ||
| Official Close 3 Mon. Ask |
16,370.00 USD/mt |
14,409.00 USD/mt |
3,285.00 USD/mt |
|
| LME stocks in mt | ||||
| August 17, 2026 | September 17, 2026 | Delta in mt | Delta in % | |
| Nickel (Ni) | 264,762 | 278,790 | + 14,028 | + 5.30% |
| Copper (Cu) | 207,825 | 255,900 | + 48,075 | + 23.13% |
| Aluminium (Al) | 246,925 | 242,600 | – 4,325 | – 1.75% |

































